










Miller, L. C. et al. (2019) Causal inference in generalizable environments: systematic 
representative design. Psychological Inquiry, 30(4), pp. 173-202.  
(doi: 10.1080/1047840X.2019.1693866) 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 













Deposited on 27 August 2019 
 





















Causal Inference in Generalizable Environments: Systematic Representative Design 
Lynn C. Miller, Sonia Jawaid Shaikh, David C. Jeong, Liyuan Wang, 
University of Southern California 
Traci K. Gillig,  
Washington State University 
Carlos G. Godoy, and Paul R. Appleby 
University of Southern California 
Charisse L. Corsbie-Massay 
Syracuse University 
Stacy Marsella 
University of Glasgow and Northeastern University 
John L. Christensen 
University of Connecticut 
Stephen J. Read 
University of Southern California 
 
Author Note 
Lynn C. Miller, Sonia Jawaid Shaikh, David C. Jeong, Liyuan Wang, University 
of Southern California, Traci K. Gillig,  Washington State University, Carlos G. Godoy, 
and Paul R. Appleby, University of Southern California; Charisse L. Corsbie-Massay, 
Syracuse University; Stacy Marsella, University of Glasgow and Northeastern 
 
 
University; John L. Christensen, University of Connecticut; Stephen J. Read, University 
of Southern California. 
Research reported in this article was supported by the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse under R01DA031626 awarded to Stephen Read (PI), by the National Institute of 
Mental Health under R01MH082671, awarded to Lynn Miller (PI), and the National 
Institute of General Medical Sciences under R01GM10996 awarded to Stephen Read and 
Lynn Miller (PIs). The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not 
necessarily represent the official views of NIDA, NIMH, or NIGMS. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lynn C. Miller, 
University of Southern California, Annenberg School for Communication and 






Causal inference and generalizability ​both ​matter.  Historically, systematic designs 
emphasize causal inference, while representative designs focus on generalizability.  Here, 
we suggest a transformative synthesis – ​Systematic Representative Design (SRD) ​– 
concurrently enhancing both causal inference and “built-in” generalizability by 
leveraging today’s intelligent agent, virtual environments, and other technologies.  In 
SRD, a “default control group” (DCG) can be created in a virtual environment by 
representatively sampling ​from real-world situations. Experimental groups can be built 
with systematic manipulations onto the DCG base.  Applying ​systematic design features 
(e.g., random assignment to DCG versus experimental groups) in SRD affords valid 
causal inferences.  After explicating the proposed SRD synthesis, we delineate how the 
approach concurrently advances generalizability and robustness, cause-effect inference 
and precision science, a computationally-enabled cumulative psychological science 
supporting both “bigger theory” and concrete implementations grappling with tough 
questions (e.g., what is context?) and affording rapidly-scalable interventions for 
real-world problems. 
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Causal Inference in Generalizable Environments: Systematic Representative Design 
 
Science and everyday life cannot and should not be separated. Science, for me, gives a 
partial explanation for life. In so far as it goes, it is based on fact, experience and 
experiment. 
Rosalind Franklin, Ph.D. 
Across science, “causality is at the crux of metaphysical, epistemological, and 
methodological issues” (Illari, Russo, & Williamson, 2011, p. 20).  Although modern 
causal analysis, involving "mathematizing causality", using causal diagrams and 
symbolic languages (e.g., ​do​-calculus) (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018, p. 7), offers the 
capacity for valid cause-effect claims across a range of methods (Pearl & Mackenzie, 
2018), historically, classic experiments have most readily afforded such inferences.   
But, “to different degrees, all causal relationships are ​context dependent , so the 1
generalization of experimental effects [across studies, with different populations of 
individuals, settings, situations, methods, and so forth, also referred to as external 
validity] is always at issue” (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 5, material in brackets 
added, words italicized for emphasis).    2
1 Context matters; but, rarely is it defined. Van Overwalle (1997) draws on Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972, 
p. 88) definition from the animal learning literature in which context refers to the relatively constant 
“situational stimuli arising from the ...environment” (see Van Overwalle & Van Rooy, 1998 for further 
treatment of this issue).  For example, some aspects of context may provide a more or less constant 
background across individuals (e.g., a bar has different affordances than a church or a school). But, even 
there, other aspects of the “context” can be changing (e.g., whether we are in a “pick-up” situation or not 
and if so what is our role (given goals, beliefs, etc.) and where in the potential “pick-up” scenario are we)  
2 ​Rarely is a single factor,”X”, deterministic (i.e., always necessary ​and ​sufficient) in causing “Y”.  Instead, 
causal relationships tend to be probabilistic (Eells, 1991), such that “many factors are usually required for 
an effect to occur, but we rarely know all of them and how they relate to each other.” (Shadish et al., 2002, 
p. 5). Thus, across experiments “a given causal relationship will occur under some conditions but not 
universally across time, space, human populations, or other kinds of treatments and outcomes that are more 
 
 
As Brewer and Crano (2014, p. 19) note, generalizability or replicability, could be 
designed into an experimental operationalization by using ​representative ​ sampling of the 
targets to which researchers wish to generalize.  Representative sampling (e.g., of 
persons, stimuli, contexts, and their interactions) in the design phase of developing one’s 
experimental and control conditions would simultaneously “build in” a new type of 
generalizability – ​generalizability to everyday life ​(GEL).  Although historically most 
researchers have deemed it not feasible within experiments to optimize representativeness 
of the “​organism-in-situation” ​(Cronbach, 1957) to which we wish to generalize, the goal 
of the current work is to suggest that it is advantageous and feasible using today’s 
technologies to build-in the capacity for ​both ​valid causal inferences and GEL into our 
experiments.   
The argument that we should build the capacity for causal inference within 
generalizable environments fits with other emerging experimental paradigm shifts in the 
biological sciences.  Motivated by the replicability crisis and a related issue, the often 
poor transferability of findings from mice to humans, biologists are developing new 
experimental designs “in more natural habitats [with wild mice that] can deliver results 
dramatically different from those in traditional laboratories – with profound implications 
for biomedical science” (Beans, 2018, p. 3196, material in brackets added).  Rethinking 
traditional trade-offs in biology between control (e.g., controlled diet, temperature) and 
or less related to those studied.” (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 5).   Furthermore, modern causal analysis has 
broad implications, including for the transportability of experimental results to new populations (e.g., in 
observational studies), or external validity (Pearl & Bareinboim, 2014; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018).  But, the 
generalizability of interest in these analyses (i.e., external validity) does not insure generalizability to 




generalizability (e.g., better transferability when wild mice live under more natural 
organism-environmental conditions), some argue a paradigm shift in experimental design 
is imminent (Garner, Gaskill, Weber, Ahloy-Dallaire, & Pritchett-Corning, 2017).  Like 
the biologists above, we argue for new experimental paradigms in more real-world 
representative contexts with more “organism-in-situation” interactions (Cronbach, 1957, 
p. 682) to which we wish to generalize.   
Both ​ the capacity for valid causal inference  ​and​ generalizability  matter: But, 3 4
why do psychologists need to worry about building causal inference capacity into 
generalizable​ environments?  For many decades, researchers have complained about the 
generalizability of college samples (Gergen, 1973; Sears, 1986).  Recently, psychology 
may have reached its own tipping point: A meta-analysis made it shockingly clear that 
WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) samples are often 
outliers and their behavioral and response patterns are among the least representative 
across human samples, raising concerns about making broad claims about human nature 
using WEIRD samples in (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  Unfortunately, 
participant sampling is only part of the generalizability problem.   
3 Historically, the capacity for causal inference within experiments is defined in terms of a series of 
procedures that eliminate alternative explanations for differences in the dependent variable between, for 
example, the experimental and control groups, other than as due to the prior manipulation of the 
independent variable (see below in the section on systematic design and the promise of causality; see also, 
Brewer & Crano, 2014).  
4 Generalizability to everyday life (GEL) is a new concept that is defined as the “built in” capacity to 
generalize the results of a study.  We do so by first identifying-- using formative research -- what for the 
persons of interest (POI) are the situations and sequences of interest (SOI) leading up to  the  behaviors of 
interest (BOI).  Using sampling theory we representatively sample from these SOI for BOI to which we 
wish to generalize,  ​implementing ​these SOI and BOI in the default control group (DCG), for example in a 
digital game (see Miller et al,, 2019; Appendix).  External validity has historically been used as a measure 
of generalizability in experiments: It is defined in terms of the capacity to generalize the cause-effect 
relationship found in one study to the effects found in another with a different sample (e.g., of participants; 
or stimuli, etc.). External validity, however, does not insure GEL (see below for further discussion).  
 
 
Currently, generalizability across experimental operationalizations of ​social 
contexts ​ can also be problematic (Ceci, Kahan, & Braman, 2010).  It is not surprising that 
context similarity was associated with the success of exact replication efforts in a sample 
of 100 replication study attempts (Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 
2016). But, even with similarity in location, time, or culture, emerging examples from the 
psychological literature suggest that moving from more traditional, less representative 
stimuli and contexts to more naturalistic and representative contexts can 
fundamentally alter ​ patterns of findings:  The underlying mediational processes 
implicated for the target behavior of interest can be dramatically different (Gendron, 
Mesquita, & Barrett, 2013; Levine, Blair, & Clare, 2013).  
How did we end up in this situation? Historically, the presumption was that 
“tight” experimental control (e.g., often using denatured stimuli or atypical contexts in 
operationalizations that might separate a potential “X” causal variable from others) 
enhanced internal validity (capacity to make valid causal inferences from “X” to “Y”). 
More stripped-down stimuli might afford more “clean” systematic manipulations with 
fewer potential third variables (affording an alternative explanation)  (Aronson, 5
Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990).  Many argued that design elements that 
increased internal validity (and operationalizations that reduced third variable 
explanations) should be prioritized over generalizability (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 
1982; Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1983; Campbell, 1957; Mook, 1983).  However, by 
generalizability here, what was meant was external validity (Campbell, 1957; Campbell 
5 But, because they were stripped down, they might produce smaller effects (i.e., such stimuli might be less 
involving and impactful) (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990). 
 
 
& Stanley, 1966). This involved demonstrating that a cause-effect relationship found in 
one, typically experimental study, is found when the population of individuals, settings, 
methods, and so forth are changed, often in a non-systematic, piecemeal fashion, with 
similar narrow operationalizations.  The logic went: demonstrate cause-effect first, then 
external validity, and if need be, moderators.  But, there is a fundamental problem here: 
Demonstrating external validity does ​not​ mean that these cause-effect relationships 
necessarily generalize to everyday life.   6
Situations that are not, by design, representative in the first place, may 
demonstrate external validity (e.g., cause-effect relationship in one experiment found in a 
second with a different population) but not generalizability to everyday life (GEL): ​ ​The 
extent of the problem ​ ​( ​i.e., that our findings may not have GEL) ​ ​is unknown ​.  When 
operationalizations are unrepresentative, laboratory effects and processes may be their 
own kind of “weird” (Ceci, Kahan, & Braman, 2010).  Social interactions, including 
across diverse groups/targets, are a critical part of the social context.  However, social 
psychologists do not typically have participants interact with a range of partners in 
experiments, with few exceptions (e.g., speed dating, see Finkel & Eastwick, 2008), let 
6 A manipulation’s experimental realism and social impactfulness may enhance effects but may add 
extraneous variables: But, reducing extraneous variables (adding control) may weaken (potentially reducing 
replicability of) experimental effects (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, Gonzales, 1990).  Field research, with 
greater naturalism, is one compromise in this tension, but it neither necessarily affords the ​representative 
situational/setting and samples to which we would like to generalize nor the experimental control typically 
found in a laboratory study (Paluck & Cialdini, 2014).  Furthermore, an event in the lab may be similar to 
an event in real life (exhibiting mundane realism) (Aronson et al., 1990) without it having GEL.  To insure 
that the  effects and relationships (e.g., among variables) in the control are generalizable to everyday life, 
the virtual environment (described later) by design needs to be representative of the cues and 
settings/situations of interest (SOI) likely to lead to the behavior of interest (BOI) for the population of 
interest (POI) as in everyday life. And, a condition with high experimental realism (e.g., some conformity 
studies (Aronson et al., 1990)) may include situations that aren’t representative of challenging conformity 
situations, given the BOI, that individuals in a POI may confront in everyday life.  
 
 
alone representative partners and interactions.  Often a task (e.g., in social interaction; 
social perception) is heavily and unnaturally constrained: This may enhance experimental 
control but reduce GEL.  For example, meta-analyses of experiments involving stimulus 
videos of students instructed to lie or tell the truth, show consistent evidence across 
studies that participants are not particularly good at detecting deception (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006), but this may not generalize to other contexts, especially natural contexts 
where deception detection has been shown to be more frequent (Levine et al., 2013).  In 
addition, psychologists’ methodological toolbox does not include validity checks to 
assess how representative or weird our conditions (and operationalizations) might be 
compared to real-world phenomena, processes, and target behaviors of interest (BOI) for 
the target population of interest (POI).  Furthermore, complacency about real-world 
generalizability undermines psychology’s relevance to the public (Cialdini, 2009). 
Federal agencies (e.g., the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation (NSF)) increasingly 
seek designs that afford ​both c​ausal inference ​and​ real-world generalizability to serve 
public needs (Davis, O’Mahony, Gulden, Osaba, & Sieck, 2018).              
Could an experimental paradigm, affording valid causal inferences, also optimize 
GEL?  We aim here to address this question offering a new paradigm -- Systematic 
Representative Design (SRD) -- that is a synthesis of two major designs: representative 
design (Brunswik, 1943; Brunswik, 1955a, 1955b) and classic experimental or systematic 
designs (Shadish et al., 2002) with roots in Wundt (1902). Systematic designs prioritize 
designing in the capacity to make valid cause-effect inferences, while representative 
 
 
designs prioritize designing in the capacity for inferences about real-life generalizability. 
 Historically, integrating these strengths seemed impractical.  We argue that this is now 
feasible, partly due to the availability of enabling technologies.  For example, 
technologies such as intelligent agents in narrative games allow static user and partner 
features (e.g., appearance) to be systematically altered, and other parameters (e.g., agent 
goals and beliefs; agent “theory of mind” complexity) can be differentially set within and 
across studies to systematically alter agent behaviors with great precision and 
replicability, creating an array of representative interaction partners and interactions. 
 Thus, it is possible today to generate representative social interactions with diverse 
others in representative narratives (Miller et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2019).  
In making our argument, we first review the key strengths and weaknesses of 
systematic and representative designs. Second, we explicate the proposed Systematic 
Representative Design (SRD) synthesis.  For this synthesis we use classic systematic 
experimental design features (e.g., random assignment). At the same time, we build in 
GEL for our target populations via task analysis, sampling, leveraging new technologies, 
and using correlations between virtual and real-world behavior (i.e., virtual validity 
checks) to assess the achievement of GEL for our default control group (DCG).  Then, 
we design experimental groups based on that DCG base for systematic experimental 
comparisons.  Third, we discuss how SRD concurrently advances generalizability and 
robustness, cause-effect inference and precision science, and a computationally-enabled 
cumulative psychological science supporting both “bigger theory” and concrete 
 
 
implementations grappling with tough questions (e.g., what is context?) and affording 
rapidly scalable interventions for real-world problems. 
Systematic and Representative Designs 
Below, we describe and compare systematic and representative designs (Table 1).  
Each offers distinct promises and challenges concerning causality and generalizability 
and both present additional common challenges that we also address. 
Systematic Design: The Promise of Causality and the Challenge of Generalizability 
            Classic experimental designs, sometimes referred to as systematic designs 
(Brunswik, 1947), afford considerable strengths, but also have – at least as typically 
operationalized – considerable weaknesses.  Procedurally, they can afford valid ​causal 
claims ​(i.e., that “X” causes “Y”).  It has been argued that experimental designs also can 
provide ​explanatory ​inferences, that is, how, why, and under what conditions “X” causes 
“Y” (Brewer & Crano, 2014).   
Criteria for the capacity to make valid causal inferences. ​All of the following 
criteria must be met to achieve the capacity to infer valid cause-effect relationships in 
experiments: (a) the temporal order of variables is such that the potential cause or 
independent variable (IV) precedes the effect or dependent variable (DV), (b) cause and 
effect covary with one another, and (c) the elimination of plausible alternative 
explanations (e.g., participants are randomly assigned to conditions).  These criteria 
largely ensure that the cause-effect relationship claims are not undermined (Brewer & 
Crano, 2014).  Random assignment of participants is a powerful systematic design feature 
because every participant has the same chance of being assigned to any given condition 
 
 
(e.g., control versus experimental) and differences between conditions cannot be 
attributed to third variables related to the participants (e.g., participant propensities). In 
contrast, self-selection into a condition could result in a third (extraneous) variable 
responsible for outcome differences between conditions.   ​ ​Within a given research 7
setting, individual studies using these procedures are said to afford causal inferences with 
high internal validity (Campbell, 1957; Campbell & Stanley, 1966). While criteria (a) and 
(b) above do not ​require ​an experiment – a correlational study could suffice  – 8
experiments readily meet all three requirements. 
Operationalizations and construct validity. ​ ​Despite these strengths for making 
cause-effect inferences, GEL of cause-effect inferences does not depend upon the three 
basic procedural criteria or elements of systematic designs mentioned above.  Rather, it 
can be profoundly affected by how we operationalize our variables.  Operationalizations 
from a single study may vary in the extent to which they adequately represent the 
theoretical constructs or processes of interest (i.e., construct validity) (Brewer & Crano, 
2014).  For example, findings in research on emotion cue judgment suggest that the 
naturalness of stimuli and contexts in the real-world (e.g., static faces in emotion cue 
judgment research versus faces in motion or faces with bodily cues) does not merely 
7 ​As some experiments, ​within​ a condition, “self-selection” occurs, especially in long interventions.  An 
advantage of the proposed SRD is that these self-selection opportunities ​within​ conditions can be ​kept 
constant across conditions ​or systematically manipulated​. 
8 ​In correlational designs, there can be a predictor or measured independent variable “X” that ​precedes ​ a 
dependent variable “Y," where there is sufficient variability on both variables and where X and Y 
significantly covary.  Such a measured independent variable typically involves naturally occurring 
behavioral variations that are then correlated with the dependent variable.  This provides a necessary, albeit 
not sufficient basis, for causal inference (Brewer & Crano, 2014).  Causal analysis (e.g., Pearl & 
Mackenzie, 2018) suggests, however, greater causal inference potential from correlational data, especially 
for "big data" over time. 
 
 
moderate emotion cue judgment, it alters neural processing in those judgments. Indeed, 
context is always present, regardless of the researcher’s intention or awareness, and is 
arguably “integral to the emotional perception itself” (Gendron et al., 2013, p. 6).  
Another example of how operationalizations can go astray involves deception detection 
research where, in the typical design, experimentalists manipulate instructions across 
conditions, then assess human capabilities to detect others’ lies.  “Senders” (e.g., 
undergraduate participants) are ​asked ​ to lie or tell the truth, then “receivers” must try to 
discriminate lies from truths, judging only the verbal and non-verbal cues of the target on 
a videotape.  A meta-analysis investigating 206 documents indicates, “people achieve an 
average of 54% correct lie-truth judgments, correctly classifying 47% of lies as deceptive 
and 61% of truths as nondeceptive” (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, p. 214). That is, this near 
chance hit rate meant that “many lies are undetectable” (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, p. 231). 
Despite cross-study consistency, Bond and DePaulo were concerned about the denatured 
context of typical lab settings, the information available to receivers (and the information 
that was withheld from them) in making lie determinations, and the impact of that on 
real-world generalizability. Partly to address this, Levine et al. (2013) created a more 
naturalistic laboratory situation in which initial participants (IPs) could decide to go along 
with (or not) a confederate who wished to cheat on a trivia game.  Afterwards, an expert 
interviewer from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), blind to whether the initial 
participants (IPs) cheated or not, questioned and prompted diagnostic information from 
each of the IP’s in a naturalistic context: The entire interaction was recorded and shown 
to new participant observers (POs), similar to the experience of a court trial. Levine et al. 
 
 
(2013) found that new POs, blind to the IPs’ cheating, who saw a random sample of 36 
expert interviews had high detection deception accuracy (i.e., almost 94%).  Thus, more 
naturalistic set-ups (e.g., faces naturally occurring with the body versus not; 
deception-detection where target deception opportunities produce cues affording 
detection versus not) can dramatically alter researcher’s causal inferences ​. 
Representative Design:  The Promise of Generalizability and the Challenge of 
Causality  
Before discussing representative design, we introduce its theoretical foundation, 
probabilistic functionalism (see Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004 for a review). Then, 
we introduce representative design as the methodological companion for this theory. 
            Probabilistic functionalism. ​  Brunswik’s (1952) Darwinian functional approach, 
probabilistic functionalism, ​ assumed that the environment for the organism is uncertain: 
To adapt, the organism must learn, not necessarily consciously, to achieve the organism’s 
goals (distal object) using environmental (proximal) cues that provide only probabilistic 
indicators (Hammond & Stewart, 2001). Thus, psychological researchers should aim to 
discover probabilistic laws describing an organism’s adaptation (distal achievement) to 
the “causal texture of its environment” (Dhami et al., 2004, p. 962).  They could do that 
by asking, “how is an organism perceiving and responding to its probabilistic 
environment to achieve a distal variable?  Can the findings of such an experiment be used 
to predict future achievement in that environment?” (Dhami et al., 2004, p. 962). 
Visual depiction of probabilistic functionalism. ​  ​Brunswik’s (1952) theoretical 
model has been referred to as “the Lens Model” given its visualization (see Figure 1). To 
 
 
illustrate, we use an example from Dhami and Belton (2017) and start with a distal (or in 
Figure 1, environment) criterion (e.g., the public’s perception that judges are being fair). 
Imagine an available set of proximal cues in the environment and their inter-cue 
correlations that might optimally predict perceptions of a judge’s fairness. ​Ecological 
validities  refer to coefficients indicative of proximal environmental cue validity in 9
predicting to the specified distal criterion (environment) state or policy (Araújo, Davids, 
& Passos, 2007).  Taking into account a judge’s inter-cue correlations, these proximal 
cues and their relative weights, could be gleaned from that judge’s prior experience in 
making decisions in a probabilistic environment.   As Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and 10
Goldstein (2008) note, Brunswik referred to the cues in the judge’s mind and how he or 
she uses those cues to make a judgment as the ​cue utilization validities ​(see Figure 1) and 
argued for exploring and potentially statistically controlling for covariates (i.e., inter-cue 
correlations), preferring a correlational/partial-correlation approach.   Furthermore, these 11
authors also note that Brunswik specified an achievement index, or a coefficient for the 
relationship between the optimized prediction that one might get from available cues in 
the environment and the judgment provided based on which and how cues were utilized. 
From Brunswik’s probabilistic functionalism, as Dhami et al. (2004) note (see 
also Hammond & Stewart, 2001), various system designs emerge that are presumably 
9 Brunswik's (1956) ​ecological validity (actually Brunswik refers to the validities of the cues) ​and 
representative design ​are often used incorrectly and interchangeably (Araújo et al., 2007). Here, we use 
them as Brunswik intended​. 
10 Trying to learn the ecological validities of these cues, and their intercorrelations, via experience was 
presumed, with the organism ideally learning the equivalence and substitutability of different cues (e.g., if 
one set of cues were unavailable or unreliable). 
11 Dhami and Belton (2017) argue that their Brunswikian idiographic assessments and their heuristics either 
match or outperform alternatives relevant to cue utilization in making decisions.  
 
 
called systems in part because feedback (e.g., from learning, partners) was assumed.  For 
example, “the single system” approach involves using proximal cues to predict to the 
distal stimulus/criterion (or policies) and is the most common, especially in the social 
judgment policies domain.  The “double-system design” (full Lens Model parameters, see 
Figure 1) has also been used in the social judgment domain (Dhami et al., 2004). The 
“triple-system design” involves two-person use of shared probabilistic cues and is used 
for studying interpersonal processes, whereas a “four-system design” is used for studying 
group processes (see Dhami et al., 2004; Dhami & Olsson, 2008; Hammond, 1965). One 
way to study such naturally occurring cues and their role in probability judgements that 
guide the behavior of interest (BOI) (e.g., perception, decision-making, behavior) is to 
reproduce the psychological gist of the real-world adapted-for environment, bringing it 
into the lab. But how?  
            Representative design: A methodological companion. ​  Representative design 
was Brunswik’s innovative methodology that fit with his ​probabilistic functionalism 
approach.  For Brunswik (1955b; 1956), studying these “ ​organism-environment 
relations” ​(Dhami et al., 2004, p. 959) meant representatively sampling from the 
environmental situations of interest (SOI) and implementing these in a laboratory setting 
in the study design phase of research.  The SOI include the settings, contextual features, 
narratives, situations, stimuli, and choices that might lead to a BOI for a given POI and to 
which the researcher wishes to generalize.  Researchers can only make claims about the 
extent to which a certain phenomenon (e.g., a probabilistic cause-effect relationship in 
the real-world) occurs for a given population if there is adequate random sampling of 
 
 
situational cues for the BOI (Brunswik, 1955a; Brunswik, 1955b).   Brunswik urged 12
psychologists to specify in the design phase, “To what circumstances do we wish to 
generalize, or apply, our results?” (Araújo et al., 2007, p. 72). 
To bring the gist of the real-world into the lab, Brunswik pioneered human task 
analysis, with participants in his studies estimating the size of an object (based on some 
predetermined parameters) at random time intervals over a four-week period while 
experimenters objectively measured the object, repeating this procedure over 180 
situations (see Dhami et al., 2004).  This procedure provided the data Brunswik needed 
for designing his laboratory experiments’ perceptual stimuli for designed in 
generalizability. Such adequate situational sampling frames were and are feasible 
(Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991).    13
Comparing Systematic and Representative Designs (see Table 1) 
Systematic design is focused on establishing causal connections and uncovering 
“laws” using these key “designed in” features (e.g., random assignment) to enhance 
internal validity.  In contrast, Brunswik’s goal was to discover, using primarily 
correlational methods (with statistical controls in the analysis phase), individuals’ 
probabilistic laws in making and adapting predictions using environmental cues to 
achieve real-world goals (Dhami et al., 2004).  That is why an important goal in 
representative designs is to feature variables (e.g., cues) that are chosen for their 
importance in the environment (representativeness) and naturally “tied.”  For his 
12 Nonprobability sampling techniques might require a validity check since they might not cover the 
ecology to which the researcher wished to generalize (Brunswik, 1955b; Dhami et al., 2004). 
13 Gigerenzer et al. (1991) showed that representative sampling of cities (vs. not) could dramatically impact 
inferences about bias, consistent with claims that participants’ use probabilistic mental models in making 
these inferences and judgments.  
 
 
perceptual studies, Brunswik (1944) took the naturally occurring covariations (or “ties”) 
that existed between the organism and environment in the field and recreated these in the 
lab.  Alternatively, systematic designs’ variables that are artificially “tied” in the lab, are 
not tied in naturalistically occurring contexts, and conversely variables are “untied” in the 
lab that are tied naturally in the real-world. For instance, researchers may provide a face 
without the rest of a body as a stimulus, thereby “untying” naturally occurring body parts
. Similarly, a researcher may manipulate whether someone is asked to lie or tell the 14
truth without regard to whether this instruction naturally occurs, and if so, whether it does 
so with the same frequency and whether it covaries with expressed deceptive behavior.  
Thus, variables are not necessarily relevant to the natural ecology in systematic designs 
making them artifactually “untied” (or “tied”) and limiting researchers’ ability to assess 
psychological processes as they function for organisms in the environment for which the 
organism is adapted, i.e., reducing generalizability (Dhami et al., 2004). 
Systematic and representative designs have complementary strengths and 
weaknesses: The former more readily affords the capacity for valid experimental causal 
inferences and the latter more readily affords the capacity for generalizability.  However, 
currently neither researchers taking a systematic design approach nor researchers taking a 
representative design approach seriously consider ​context ​. Yet, doing so, and trying to 
address the question of, “what is the context here,”  is essential to adequately implement 
SRD.  Context is often defined in terms of situations (e.g., Van Overwalle & Van Rooy, 
1998).  Unfortunately, we still do not have adequate definitions and taxonomies of those 
14 We can not even assume that across studies with faces, the same cause-effect relationships will result. 
For example, the orientation of the face can affect social perception (Witkower & Tracy, 2019).  
 
 
either (see below). Understanding how people think about situations is key to 
understanding how humans structure social meaning and therefore, key to our ability to 
create SRDs.  Of course, it is not enough to understand how individuals categorize only 
the current situation, we need to understand when, why, and how for whom the situation 
changes.  Narratives, as we argue below, help ​s ​tructure understanding and prediction of 
social interaction within a situation and across situations over time.  
Missing Pieces: Structuring the Dynamics of Social Interaction 
            What is a situation?​  Social situations, including the presence or implied 
presence of others (Allport, 1968), and a taxonomy of them, have long been thought to be 
critical to the very definition of social psychology (Baron, Byrne, & Suls, 1989; Hilton, 
2012; Milgram, 1965). For example, Milgram said, “Ultimately, social psychology would 
like to have a compelling ​theory of situations ​which will, first present a language in terms 
of which situations can be defined; proceed to a typology of situations; and then point to 
the manner in which definable properties of situations are transformed into psychological 
forces in the individual ​” ​(1965, p. 74). But, despite advances in defining situations 
(Argyle, Furnham, & Graham, 1981; Rauthmann et al., 2014; Yang, Read, & Miller, 
2006), ​ there is neither consensus on what a situation is nor a “matrix” or “taxonomy” 
within which these “situations” or combinations of features composing situations are 
arranged , which would tell us something fundamental about how changes in key 15
15 This situation may be analogous to the situation in chemistry before the development of The Periodic 
Table that is used as the basis for predictions, hypothesis testing, and theory in chemistry that some have 
argued moved chemistry from a pre-paradigmatic science to a science as physicists would think of it (see 
Scerri, 2007).  
 
 
underlying parameters alter behavior (Kenny, Mohr, and Levesque, 2001; Reis, 2008; 
Swann & Seyle, 2005).  
However, agreement regarding defining situations, or identifying situations’ 
underpinning features, may be emerging. For example, key to situations are their 
affordances for goal pursuit (Argyle et al., 1981; Baron & Boudreau, 1987; Argyle, 
Furnham, & Graham, 1981; Grant & Dweck, 1999; Miller, Cody, & McLaughlin, 1994; 
Miller & Read, 1991; Read & Miller, 1989a,1989b; Reis, 2008; Yang et al., 2006).  
One way that the term situation has been construed is in terms of settings and situational 
awareness in those settings (Killingsworth, S. A. Miller., & Alavosius, 2016).  A setting, 
like a church or an emergency room, constrains the likely goals and tasks, as well as 
likely scenarios and actions. Endsley (1995) conceptualized situation awareness in terms 
of three levels of consideration: (a) perception, (b) comprehension, and (c) projection. At 
the perceptual level, there is a focus on perceptual cues and stimuli that are relevant to 
successfully performing tasks or understanding the situation (e.g., if changes are slow or 
rapid); Brunswik’s theory and approach were most focused at this level (Brunswik, 
1955b).  At the comprehension (or meaning) level, humans learn the organizing 
structures (e.g., narratives, scripts, pattern matches) to make sense of what is happening 
(e.g., an emergency).  At the projection level, humans anticipate and predict future 
situations (e.g., given a shooting and numerous causalities, a hospital low on staff) based 
on what is happening and the rate with which it is changing.  Top-down models and 
organizing structures can facilitate this future projection.  
 
 
            What is happening here over time? Why and how do I respond to it?  ​Social 
interactions are complex and dynamic. For example, to understand how people extract 
meaning from the current, as well as prior and potentially future interactions, and then to 
respond to the situation, draws us into diverse literatures (e.g., in contextual sequence 
analysis, see Cornwell, 2015). Participants in our studies, as well as intelligent agents in 
some games (Marsella, Pynadath, & Read, 2004), are trying to do two things 
concurrently: (a) understand “what is happening here” (e.g., social perception, 
comprehension-meaning; projection into the future using theory of mind about self and 
other and prior experience/learning), and (b) understand “why and how should I respond 
to it” (decision-making and enactment of behavior).  This is based on often automatic 
inferences involving theory of mind (e.g., about beliefs about self, other (e.g., Marsella, 
Pynadath, & Read, 2004)) and considerations of one’s own goals and plans, as well as 
resources to achieve them, given prior experiences and what the individual/agent thinks 
might happen if he/she made various choices now and with unfolding choices by all 
parties involved. 
In probabilistic functionalism, Brunswik focused on how people use perceptual 
cues to predict what was going to happen, but perceptual cues are unlikely to suffice in 
complex social interaction without a way to structure such data.  How could streams of 
cues be structured to constrain and make sense of these cue utilizations over time? 
Brunswik and his followers did not answer that question. Others, especially those 
concerned with narrative structure, however, have tried to address it. 
 
 
Narratives help structure understanding and prediction of social interaction 
over time. ​ ​ Stories or narratives provide a coherent way to understand the meaning of an 
action by ​contextualizing ​ or ​situating ​the action in relation to the other actions or events 
involving self and others (e.g., Pennington & Hastie, 1986).  Whether involving human 
behavior (e.g., Barker, 1963; Barker & Wright, 1955; Forgas, 1979; G. A. Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) or text processing (e.g., Mandler, 1978; Rumelhart, 1977), 
most action sequences have four components, including the sequence’s goal, actions 
making up the plan to achieve the goal, initiating conditions, and the outcome.  Evidence 
suggests that this source-goal-plan-unit structure facilitates memory (Abbott & Black, 
1986).  As Read (1987) notes, the action sequence alone is insufficient to provide this 
information; additional detailed information is required (e.g., knowledge of the actors’ 
goals and how these actions fit together into a plan for goal achievement) or inferred, 
which forms the basis of a coherent mental representation that can be used to answer 
questions about what happened and why (e.g., Black, Galambos, & Read, 1984; Graesser, 
1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977).  Read’s (1987) narrative-based model of attribution 
argued that humans use social knowledge structures (e.g., scripts, plans, goals, and 
themes) in constructing causal scenarios for causal reasoning and explanation.  Often 
these structures are hierarchically nested (Figure 2), such that subgoals are achieved in 
the service of the goals most heavily activated in a given moment in the interaction, due 
to both within-person changes (e.g., due to situational or interoceptive state changes) 
(Read & Miller, in press; Read, Smith, Droutman, & Miller, 2017) and between-person 
differences (e.g., in chronic relative goal activations) (Read & Miller, in press). 
 
 
            Communication patterns and narratives can help frame the causal structure of 
social interaction. ​In social interactions, humans or actors typically take “turns” (e.g., 
alternating speaker and receiver roles).  These “turns” of one social actor vis à vis another 
could potentially signal new situations and pertinent cues that involve inferences about 
“why” (e.g., Why did person A do or say that to Person B? Why did person B grimace 
when A said that to him/her?).  As suggested above, these inferences leverage knowledge 
structures, (e.g., self and others’ goals and beliefs; Miller & Read, 1987, 1991): 
Narratives or stories can frame and structure causal scenarios and meaning (Read & 
Miller, 1995; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Schank & Abelson, 1995).  Indeed, narratives, 
which can facilitate interpersonal as well as group communication, may be so 
fundamental because of their capacity to fulfill core social motives, which are tied to 
identity (Costabile, Shedlosky-Shoemaker, & Austin, 2018).   
Identity and cultural framing of the meaning of actions. ​ Developmental and 
personality psychologists have argued that cultural and self-understanding (Bruner, 1987; 
Bruner, 1990; Fivush, Habermas, Waters, & Zaman, 2011; McAdams, 1990, 2001, 2008; 
Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Thorne & McLean, 2003) is not just about sequences of actions, 
but importantly about how action sequences are framed (e.g., in terms of the goals, 
beliefs, meaning of what just happened).  Parental scaffolding of children’s narrative 
framing of the world starts early--by 16 months of age (Reese, 2002). The neural basis of 
these stories about self and others, often implicating values, is gaining attention (e.g., 
D’Argembeau et al., 2014).  Narrative is critical to the construction of meaning and 
therefore critical to representative design in the study of human behavior: Narrative ties 
 
 
together one’s immediate and long-term experience pertaining to self- and 
cultural-identities, and projects expectancies regarding self, others, and the unfolding 
situation into the future.  
Systematic Representative Design (SRD): A Unifying Design Framework 
Systematic Representative Design (SRD) is an experimental approach that 
attempts to optimize the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of systematic and 
representative designs, better affording ​both ​ valid causal inferences and greater GEL (see 
Table 1).  In addition, SRD uses representative narrative structures and other 
considerations (e.g., cueing based on cultural scripts) to grapple with “missing pieces” in 
past experimental designs that do not adequately contextualize the POI’s everyday 
experiences and behavioral choices.  To achieve this end, we leverage the power of new 
enabling technologies including virtual environments and games, intelligent agents, 
mobile technologies and sensors. Below, we first discuss the features that SRD adopts 
from standard systematic and representative designs, as well as additional innovations in 
research design.  Then, we discuss these enabling technologies in the following section 
and how they enable SRD. 
Optimizing Systematic Design Strengths in SRD 
A strength of systematic designs, compared to representative designs, is the 
ability to more easily afford valid cause-effect relationship inferences.  SRDs leverage 
those strengths by meeting the standard criteria of classic systematic design experiments. 
For example, in a standard two-cell between-subjects experimental design, SRD 
participants would be ​randomly assigned ​to the “default control group” (DCG) or one 
 
 
alternative experimental condition built upon the DCG base (E ​1​DCG).  The experimental 
and control groups would be the same, except for the manipulation of the independent 
variable (e.g., in a two-cell design) or independent variables (in a multifactor design) 
after which the dependent BOIs are assessed.  Therefore, differences in participant 
behavior after random assignment between conditions can be attributed to the 
manipulation of the independent variable.  Thus: (a) the potential cause ​precedes ​ the 
effect, (b) cause and effect covary with one another, and (c) important plausible 
alternative explanations are eliminated by random assignment, helping ensure that the 
conditions do not differ from one another except on the variables manipulated.  The 
difference between an SRD and a systematic design is the DCG, which is designed to be 
representative of the settings, situations, and stimuli to which we wish to generalize for 
the POI and target BOI.   16
Optimizing Representative Design Strengths in SRD 
In systematic designs, neither control nor experimental groups are typically 
designed to be representative of the SOI to which the researcher wishes to generalize for 
the POI.  In representative designs, researchers typically attempt to representatively 
16 Procedurally, in classic experimental designs, participants do not self-select themselves into condition. 
Instead, they are randomly assigned to conditions, to eliminate the possibility that differences between 
conditions are due to participants’ pre-existing differences instead of the manipulation. Procedurally, in 
SRD, participants are randomly assigned to the DCG or a given experimental condition; participants then 
make choices (e.g., in a virtual environment game) just like in classic designs. Others (e.g., virtual 
intelligent agents) subsequently respond to the participants’ responses, and those responses are adjusted 
given the participant’s behavior.  Different agent responses can then affect the participant’s subsequent 
options and choices, creating interactional sequences into which participants “self-select” that are 
narratively designed to be more generalizable to everyday life (see below; Appendix; Miller, Wang, Jeong, 
& Gillig, 2019).  However, there are not​ between group differences ​in self-selection opportunities in SRD, 
unless systematically manipulated by design with all other variables held constant or controlled as a source 
of alternative explanations. Thus, this type of “self-selection” during the course of a game does not present 




sample SOI and then assess cue utilizations in predicting some decision or response 
outcome (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1991).  Research using representative designs has mostly 
been conducted in domains involving perception, decision-making, or social perception 
and judgment.  In such contexts, there is typically one decision (e.g., setting bail) for a 
given individual (e.g., a judge in a given case).  Task analysis enabling representative 
designs and conceptualizing cue utilization with new heuristics can require considerable 
formative work, but the payoff may be more evidence-based psychological models in line 
with how humans make decisions and respond to their actual environment.  Such models 
can be more predictive and useful compared to alternative heuristics and statistical 
models (Dhami & Belton, 2017).  However, past efforts to create representative designs 
typically lack extended dynamic social interaction leading up to the BOI.  Generally, 
these models are not concerned with temporal sequence in the meaning of action.   
Representatively sampling can be complex. ​Representatively sampling from 
extended behavioral interactions in SOI leading to an eventual BOI (e.g., a risky sexual 
decision) is complicated. Extended social interactions often involve intervening obstacles 
and challenges, each with decision points impacting the eventual BOI.  Ensuring that 
settings, situations (including extended social interactions) and stimuli are representative 
for the target audience and target behavior to which we wish to generalize might 
seem impossible.   
Sampling for implementation into DCG. ​However, we argue that it is not too 
difficult using the power of enabling technologies such as virtual environments to 
develop DCG and Experimental conditions built on the DCG base (E ​1​DCG) (Miller et al., 
 
 
2019). In order to create a representative sample for the default control group (DCG) in 
SRD a social scientist takes a series of steps, as provided in Table 2 with an example. 
This includes identifying the BOI, the POI and identifying and recruiting representative 
samples of POI, identifying the most frequent settings  (MFS) leading up to BOI for POI, 
extracting details (e.g., cues for POI in MFS), identifying relevant scripts in MFS, 
identifying the components of those scripts (SCs), and the “entry” and “exit” conditions 
for each SC, additional details and frequency of response options, and so forth.  In the 
Appendix we elaborate on this process (see also Miller et al., 2019).  
Virtual validity check. ​To insure that a given DCG is representative of everyday 
life, however, we also use a “virtual validity check” by correlating participant virtual 
choice to their prior behavior (e.g., past 90 days) in response to similar real-life 
situations. We found that these coefficients were quite high, approaching values normally 
associated with test-retest reliability (see for example, Godoy et al., 2013; Smith et al., 
2018). Below, we first briefly discuss some of these technologies and their use for a 
science involving SRD.  
SRD Virtual Environments 
Definitions and background. ​ Virtual environments are artificial environments 
in which one’s actions determine what happens next in the pursuit of goals (Overmars, 
2005). Virtual environments require a combination of software and hardware (e.g., virtual 
reality (VR) , computer hardware).   In virtual environment without VR, one can push 17 18
17 VR can consume the user’s audio and visual senses, activating haptic responses.  
18 Related technologies include augmented reality (AR) in which virtual objects are overlaid onto one’s 
real-life world and mixed reality (MR) that augments as above but also anchors those virtual objects, 
making it possible to interact with them in the real-world. (Garon, Boulet, Doironz, Beauliu, & Lalonde, 
2016; Tepper, Rudy, Lefkowitz, Weimer, Marks, Stern, & Garfein, 2017; Tokareva, J. (2018). Haptic 
 
 
or click buttons or move a mouse in making choices for one’s character (for example in a 
digital game): This can be very engaging, affording opportunities for studying complex 
psychological processes in representative social interactions between one’s own agent 
(that one controls) and other agents.  When those other agents are “intelligent agents” 
within a digital game (using software such as PsychSim (Marsella, Pynadath, & Read, 
2004)) whose parameters (e.g., for goals and beliefs) can be set to emulate the variability 
within and between various groups and cultures, one can have the “feel” of very complex 
extended social interactions (Marsella, Pynadath, & Read, 2004) in a 3-Dimensional 
animated environment (for example, see Christensen et al., 2013). Those interactions 
could be dyadic or involve participants interacting with representative team members or 
manipulations of same (or other variables).  
A virtual reality (VR) headset, on the other hand, obscures all but the virtual 
environment and enables one to feel one’s senses immersed in the virtual environment. 
With VR, the user moves his or her own body through the virtual environment assuming 
the identity of an avatar as he or she moves through the virtual environment.  For 
example, looking at a virtual environment without VR of a mechanic working on a 
vehicle one can see the steps the mechanic takes and even choose them.  The same 
simulation with VR, can enable the user to get the “feel” of the mechanics of the actions 
as if corporeally immersed in the interaction that offers haptic feedback (e.g., feeling 
one’s hand using a tool or lifting and removing objects). The user can interact with other 
avatars, but at least at present, the nature of those social interactions tends to be more 
interfaces may be especially interesting for applications with mixed reality and smartphones with 
digital/VR games “in the wild” for example. (Lee, Sinclair, Gonzalez-Franco, Ofek, & Holz, 2019) 
 
 
restricted (and typically are quite “clunky”) than that which is possible in non-VR virtual 
environments.  
Digital video games  afford the user features of a virtual environment experience 19
(e.g., the user can control computer keys, pads, etc. to make choices that affect how the 
action proceeds; receive feedback). This involves software and hardware (e.g., an 
electronic gaming device; a laptop computer; a smartphone -- all of which today are 
likely to have the capacity to control graphic images and a TV or other screen for 
displaying images).  Digital video games can involve VR or not : They are often 20
classified by their game genre (e.g., role-play, active, active adventure, adventure, 
simulation , strategy,  etc.) , game purpose (e.g., entertainment  or serious -- such as  to 21 22
enhance health, education, or training), and type of game platform (e.g., for use on 
mobile phones, personal computers, iPads, or that can be used cross-platform) ​(​Adams, 
2013).  For SRD, the video game genre most relevant involves simulations.  Simulations
 are typically designed to emulate real-world scenarios . Generally, SRD would fall 23 24
19 The broader category of games includes games that are not video games, such as card games. There are 
other things described as games (e.g., economic games, such as “prisoner’s dilemma”) that are associated 
with game theory, involving the modeling of strategic interactions between rational players (see for 
example, Myerson, 1991).  These literatures, however, are well outside the scope of the current work.  
20 The video game industry, including the much smaller VR video game industry, is a major industry, 
rapidly overtaking the 125 billion dollar annual mark (Gaudiosi, 2016).  
21 A commercial version is the well known video game simulation (and its many variants) called the 
“Sims.”  
22 As Adams (2013) notes there are also subgenres within each of these genre types (e.g., shooter games are 
a subgenre of action video games).  
23 Simulations are sometimes classified within the category of digital games and sometimes not, depending 
upon one’s specific definition of “video games” and the specific nature of the simulation in question. For 
our current purposes -- we are interested for research and behavior change purposes in the capabilities of 
such software and hardware for implementing the “gist” of representative SOI and BOI for a POI within a 
virtual world -- when it comes to language pertaining to such distinctions (e.g., when is a simulation not a 
game) we find ourselves in agreement philosophically with Wittgenstein (2009). 
24 Simulators, for example flight simulators, have been used extensively for decades and found to be highly 
effective (Hays, Jacobs, Prince, & Salas, 1992) 
 
 
under the category of a “serious game” because it is not primarily designed for 
entertainment, but rather as a “test-bed” for science and for developing interventions for 
behavior change. Diving further into these and other game-related distinctions, however, 
is well beyond the scope of the current work.  
Brief comparison of VR and Non-VR digital games.  ​Given their current status, 
the choice of whether to use VR or not in research and interventions depends upon the 
researcher’s goals and the nature of the planned intervention.  At present, VR would 
likely be a great choice where the premium on research is on the sensory/physical (e.g., 
eye-hand coordination; sensory systems and multi-sensory cues or triggers involving 
visual and auditory channels).  This is because, with the increasing sophistication of VR, 
more granular grasping and bodily precision movements are becoming possible, for 
example with haptic interfaces that the user wears that provide feedback from the touched 
object as if it is real (Lee, Sinclair, Gonzalez-Franco, Ofek, & Holz, 2019).  In contrast, 
digital non-VR games, can feature underlying software with intelligent agents that affords 
new possibilities for understanding social processes and enhancing social and 
communication interactions and skills (such intelligent agents are not currently available 
in a VR version). Below, we start with a little of the “bigger picture” of virtual games and 
their utility and then focus on a much smaller subset of virtual environments designed to 
be more representative of everyday life.  
Overview of virtual environment’s applied potential.  ​Digital games, including 
commercial games ​ ​designed for entertainment and those not designed primarily for 
entertainment (i.e., serious games), until recently have mostly not used VR.  Existing 
 
 
games have shown promise as interventions, whether designed with that goal in mind or 
not.  As the review by Granic, Lobel, and Engels (2010) makes clear, a wide variety of 
games, including commercially designed games for entertainment, have potential for 
producing positive motivational, affective, cognitive, and social effects.  For example, 
playing some shooter games (a subgenre of active games), may dramatically enhance 
player’s spatial skills (Uttal et al., 2013), which, in turn, predict achievements in STEM 
fields (i.e., science, technology, engineering and math) (Wai, Lubinski, Benbow, & 
Steiger, 2010).  This is quite remarkable, especially since many of these commercial 
games of various genres (including shooter games) are designed for entertainment, and 
not for education, per se. Although education scholars may learn quite a bit from studying 
such entertainment games, and why they may be effective for enhancing learning (Gee, 
2003), they are neither designed to provide a test-bed for basic science nor designed for 
“serious game” applications (e.g., serious games can have the primary goal of assessing 
or changing behavior). Most games with the primary goal of providing entertainment are 
not designed to provide a representative environment for assessing or changing behavior.  
For those games designed as serious games, there are a number of other 
meta-analyses and reviews pertaining to their effectiveness (e.g., Papastergiou, 2009; 
Hieftje et al., 2013).   Serious games often try to entertain (and be fun) while also 25
25 ​In studies with commercial games as well as randomized trials with serious games, whether VR or 
virtual games, the control group is most often either a wait-list control group or it’s another game. Each has 
weaknesses, in that effects in the former may be due to using a game without the intervention components 
critical; The effects in the later are hard to compare because so many variables differ across games (Granic, 
et al., 2014).  Furthermore, for meta-analyses the control comparison with a comparison game differs 
considerably across studies whereas with a wait-list control group that control condition is more “constant”. 
SRD addresses this issue by first developing the DCG that can be used as the appropriate control in a 
randomized controlled trial.  
 
 
advancing learning (e.g., knowledge, developing skills, enhancing mastery, such as of 
self-monitoring) by using a variety of underpinning theories (e.g., about observational 
learning; about message tailoring, about persuasion, social cognitive theory, etc.):  For 
example, they may achieve these dual goals with adventure stories in fictional worlds 
(Thompson, 2012).  Although there are a number of simulations/ game simulations that 
show good transfer of knowledge and skills (e.g., Gaba, Howard, Fish, Smith, & Sowb, 
2001; Lateef, 2010), most of these serious games are not designed to be simulations 
and/or representative of scenarios/choices in everyday life.  Our focus below, although 
not intended to be a thorough review, provides examples of research using 
games/simulations (whether with VR or not). The games/simulations reviewed are those 
that could be considered more representative of the scenarios and challenges of everyday 
life.  
More representative virtual environment designed for research, diagnosis, 
and treatment. ​ Below, we discuss research from this growing literature using more 
representative designs that involve virtual reality (VR) and non-VR digital game 
interactive narrative (IN) environments and how we could leverage these technologies to 
advance a new paradigm for psychological science.  
Virtual reality (VR) ​. ​Below, we consider VR’s use in enabling better basic 
experimental research.  We also consider VR’s use in creating better applications for 
diagnosis and/or treatment (e.g., of a mental health disorder).  
Enhancing external validity ​. Blascovich et al.’s (Blascovich, Loomis, Beall, 
Swinth, Hoyt, & Bailenson, 2002) pioneering work showed that VR environments could 
 
 
be used to assess whether classic experimental social psychology studies ​conducted in the 
lab ​ (e.g., social influence in gambling situations that are more naturalistic) generalize to 
the virtual environment (Blascovich et al., 2002).  Some researchers have made the 
argument that virtual environments take an intermediate ground in the perceived 
“tradeoff” between internal validity and external validity for research and assessment 
(Blascovich, et al., 2002; Schonbrodt & Asendorpf, 2011; Johnsen, Raij, Stevens, Lind, 
& Lok, 2007).  This seems a reasonable claim within the context of standard 
experimental designs, that also nicely gets at the issue of external validity.  
 But, this approach does not address GEL.  It is unclear if individuals’ ​virtual 
behaviors in response to ​virtual ​situational triggers are similar to their behaviors in 
comparative situations in their everyday lives. Further, while VR has considerable 
promise, we believe that its promise goes well beyond a “tradeoff” between internal and 
external validity (see below).  
 ​Is VR effective for diagnosis and/or treatment? ​A recent review of the more than 
two dozen review ​ ​articles of the use of VR demonstrates the potential for VR in diagnosis 
and treatment (Riva, Wiederhold, & Mantovani, 2019), including the diagnosis and 
reduction of the effects of PTSD and sexual violence (e.g., Rothbaum, Rizzo, & Difede, 
2010; Rizzo & Koenig, 2017; Rizzo et al., 2014). It also demonstrates potential for the 
diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, such as compulsions in response to 
everyday life (van Bennekom, Kasanmoentalib, de Koning, & Denys, 2017), drug relapse 
susceptibility (Hone-blanchet, Wensing, & Fecteau, 2014), and craving in smokers (e.g., 
Bordnick et al., 2005) and alcohol abusers (e.g., Bordnick et al., 2008). VR also shows 
 
 
promising effects in the successful treatment of a range of mental health disorders, 
including anxiety disorders (for reviews see, Lindner et al., 2017; Botella et al., 2017; 
Maples-Keller et al., 2017; Cardos, David, & David, 2017; Arroll et al., 2017) and diet 
related disorders, as well as in pediatric domains (see Riva, Wiederhold, & Mantovani, 
2019).  Most of these VR diagnostic and treatment programs are based on cues/triggers 
encountered in the VR world that are representative of those afforded in the real-world.  
Why is VR so effective? ​Riva et al. (2019) note that VR is very effective in 
promoting long-term behavior change across many domains,  more so even than 26
prevailing treatment “gold standards” such as cognitive behavioral therapy.  They argue 
that this is due to: (a) embodied simulations and predictive coding, (b) the meaning of 
presence, and (c) the instantiation of real-world physical rules within the virtual 
environment.  We would add another contributing factor: VR can afford a kind of 
interactive narrative (IN) during interaction with it, especially if a therapist is guiding the 
interaction.  We explicate these four factors in the four paragraphs below. 
Consistent with work on predictive coding (e.g., Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010), 
Riva, Wiederhold, and Mantovani argue that, “VR shares with the brain the same basic 
mechanism: embodied simulations” (2019, p. 88). Body ownership and simulation, 
involving the identification and integration of internally and externally generated 
multi-sensory channelled input, enables goal-directed behavior in humans and other 
species (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Van Den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002). Research 
regarding the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) paradigm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) aids in 
26 Price and Anderson (2007) argued that although VR could facilitate a sense of presence, it did not cause a 
positive treatment outcome.  
 
 
the inference that the brain creates these embodied simulations.  In the RHI, the 
researcher simultaneously strokes both a real hidden hand and a rubber visible hand 
(externally generated cues) causing the participant to perceive body ownership over the 
rubber “hand” as determined by the participant’s response to the researcher striking the 
rubber hand with a mallet.   27
If, to effectively regulate one’s body in the world, the brain creates and maintains 
simulations of that body operating in the world -- including various interoceptive, motor, 
and sensory inputs, and links incoming multi-modal patterns of activation to similar prior 
multimodal neural activation patterns -- what does the brain do with this information? It 
is hypothesized that humans use this information in predictive coding (Friston, 2010; 
Friston & Kiebel, 2011; Clark, 2013), in which past neural patterns (e.g., involving 
multimodal distributed neuron patterns across diverse brain regions supporting the 
achievement of a specific goal, concept, or emotion activation) are used to make 
predictions about what will happen or the meaning of what is happening. When the input 
reactivates a sufficiently similar pattern of these distributed neurons, the individual 
experiences the action (e.g., Clark, 2013), concept (Barsalou, 2003), or emotion (Barrett, 
2017).  In a similar way, VR-embodied simulations may “reactivate multimodal neural 
27 This externally generated RHI paradigm it is argued involves mostly top-down processes while 
alternative similar paradigms (where the user self-initiates movement)  involving body ownership (e.g., 
moving rubber hand (mRHI), virtual hand illusion (VHI),  are more likely to be “actively shaped by 
processes which allow for continuous comparison between the expected and the actual sensory 
consequences of the actions...[These additional illusions provide the basis with a motor task using VR to 
test hypotheses about] whether during goal-oriented tasks body ownership may result from the consistency 
of forward models” (brackets added for clarity) involving both self-generated and distal multisensory cue 




networks, which have produced the simulated or expected effect before” (Riva et al., 
2019, p. 88).  
The feeling of “presence” is an important concept in virtual environment 
generally (in both VR and non-VR digital games).  Presence theory (See Lombard & 
Jones, 2015 for review) developed, in part, as a concept that accounted for the 
psychological effects of media technology that embody the user, such as robotics and 
virtual reality (Steuer, 1992; Sheridan, 1992; Biocca, 1997). Generally, presence has been 
characterized as a “mental state” (Sheridan, 1992), a “perceptual illusion” (Lombard & 
Ditton, 1997), and a psychological state (Lee, 2004).  Extending the predictive coding 
hypothesis, Riva and colleagues (2019, p. 88) re-conceptualize the concept of  “presence” 
and argue that “the feeling of presence in a space can be considered as an evolutive tool 
used to track the difference between the predicted sensations and those that are incoming 
from the sensory world, both externally and internally.”  Indeed, the level of presence one 
experiences using VR may be a function of the degree of similarity between the VR’s 
simulation model of the world and that of the brain.   If correct, this suggests that the 28
extraordinary promise of VR extends beyond diagnosis and treatment to deeply 
understanding psychological processes.  
28Researchers have suggested that we need to be careful in designing representative environments, 
avoiding and testing for problems like the uncanny valley (e.g., where the agents are so similar to the target 
person that they activate disbelief) or VR sickness (Cobb, Nichols, Ramsey, & Wilson, 1999).  However, 
although one should test for this in a given population (e.g., Benoit, Guerchouche, Petit, Chapoulie, 
Maneva, Chaurasia, Drattakis, and Robert, 2015), that as participants are more immersed and experience 
greater presence in more representative environments, and better leverage emerging technologies for their 
target populations and behaviors of interest (e.g., Garcia-Betances et al., 2015), that virtual environments 
may provide closer and closer approximations to everyday behavior in similar everyday affording situations 




The nature of the physics in VR matters. VR simulations involve some virtual 
scenes (e.g., with 3-Dimensional models of objects, character agents, and the integration 
of landmarks) that can be merged into an overall model using professional design 
software and a means (i.e., the game engine) to calculate the relations between the player 
and this 3-Dimensional model.  What is achieved is the simulation of some real-life 
physics (e.g., collision-detection, gravity, etc.) and representative human behavior in 
response to it (e.g., human movements in response to stimuli) along with physical and 
sensory (visual, auditory) capabilities (Mueller et al., 2012).  Even in clunky interactions, 
this can be enough to create a sense of presence (Regenbrecht, Schubert, & Friedmann, 
1998). However, more realistic physics-based interactions, such as physics-based 
hand-object interactions (Höll, Arth, Overweger, & Lepetit, 2018) have been improving 
dramatically, leveraging augmented and mixed reality, and likely increasing a sense of 
presence (Antotsiou, Garcia-Hernando, & Kim, 2018).  However, for SRD, more than 
just physical reality is needed.  In theory, social reality in VR could also mimic the 
quality of physical reality in VR.  In practice, VR incorporates social presence often in 
somewhat indirect or superficial ways (e.g., the presence of a sensory-based (e.g., visual, 
auditory) scene or one or a group of avatars that evokes a social interaction or the sense 
of one (i.e., the implied presence of others in a scene that mimics a conference room 
where the player is expected to speak, designed to evoke social anxiety). Where there are 
interacting avatars in VR, social interactions to date are often primitive and often clunky.  
 ​Interactive narrative (IN) games could be used with VR.  IN are systems that 
allow users to take a role in a narrative story and interact with character agents in an 
 
 
environment (Si, Marsella, & Pynadath, 2010).  Broadly, IN occurs in a range of virtual 
environments. For example, in Blascovich et al.’s (2002) virtual environments using VR, 
he and his team assessed social influence in gambling situations designed to be very 
similar to those sequences, that are interactive, in gambling situations he had constructed 
in laboratory studies years before and that can provide the affordances and cues that can 
evoke gambling scenarios.  Similarly, Rizzo and his colleagues have studied mitigating 
the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Rizzo & Koenig, 2017) and sexual 
violence (Rizzo et al., 2014) using a VR environment with visuals and sounds within 
which users experience (or might re-imagine) narratives that trigger their prior trauma 
with the guidance of a trained therapist. VR with IN-like features have also been used to 
enhance diagnosis of drug relapse susceptibility based on cues/triggers encountered in the 
virtual reality (VR) world (Hone-Blanchet, Wensing, & Fecteau, 2014).  In IN research 
and interventions, cues and scenes are often chosen to be more representative of the 
relevant triggering scenarios to afford relevant cue inter-associations present over time 
and to be of interest for the POI (e.g., PTSD triggering events).  
Non-virtual reality​. ​Representative designs without VR have also been used for a 
range of interventions. This includes those to enhance health-related communication 
(e.g., Marsella, Johnson, & LaBore, 2000) and those to reduce risky sex using an 
interactive video (Read et al., 2006), and intelligent agents (Christensen et al., 2013).  
IN games with intelligent agents. ​ “Intelligent agents” are so named because these 
agents can autonomously determine how the action within an IN proceeds based on how 
other agents and humans respond and negotiate with other agents and humans to achieve 
 
 
their goals (Marsella et al., 2004).  Intelligent agents can achieve these feats using a range 
of underpinning mechanics, sometimes with quite complex and deep psychological 
models.  For example, PsychSim software agents (Marsella et al., 2004; Miller et al., 
2011) have a “theory of mind” about the self and all the other players, including the 
human user, and these intelligent agents try to pursue goals in the negotiation based on 
their different parameter settings .  Most non-VR IN games have intelligent agents, 29
although some VR IN virtual environments are not driven by intelligent agents (e.g., 
Rizzo et al., 2014) .  Intelligent agents in IN environments have been used in a number 30
of serious games (Ritterfeld, Cody, & Vorderer, 2009), and applications for changing 
behavior (Miller et al., 2009). Our own socially optimized learning in virtual 
environments using intelligent technologies (SOLVE-IT) game (Christensen et al., 2013; 
Miller et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2011) features an extensive series of virtual date 
scenarios across two game levels designed to reduce risky sexual behavior for young men 
who have sex with men using the PsychSim Software. The parameters underlying the 
intelligent agents (e.g., affecting goals and beliefs) drive the choice of agents, which in 
combination with the human decision-maker, drive how the story proceeds. That is, agent 
parameters (that can be manipulated) play a large role in the emerging social situation. 
This nationally disseminated intervention was the first intervention to successfully reduce 
sexual shame (and to do so for young men who have sex with men) and to show that 
29 Here, the underlying person parameters (goals, beliefs) that might drive behavior of those other actors 
should be considered, bearing in mind the technology used to implement agents in the game and leveraging 
its capabilities. For example, we manipulated the parameters of intelligent agents (Marsella et al., 2004), 
including various goal weights and belief parameters to guide automatic scenarios affording different 
sexual risk challenges (SOI) leading to our BOI, risky sex, for our POI, as in the real-world.  
 
30 In theory, VR could involve intelligent “other” agents. However, this is currently not the case.  
 
 
reduction of sexual shame significantly subsequently reduces risky sex in a longitudinal 
randomized controlled trial (Christensen et al., 2013). The sophistication of IN games 
with intelligent agents for modeling complex representative social interactions, and for 
creating representative interaction partners and interactions, make it particularly 
promising for modeling and understanding representative social behavior, including 
detailed social interactions over time (and game levels) in a virtual environment.   
Game physics used with IN games with intelligent agents ​.​ ​There are a variety of 
game platforms that can afford physics as in everyday life. One of the most popular is 
called Unity, ​https://unity3d.com/unity/ ​, a 3-Dimensional animated game development 
platform  that has a real-time game engine, or software development environment. 31
Authors on this paper have used Unity for developing SOLVE-IT and many other 
applications.  Physics engines (software) built into these games enable computers to 
create and tell 3-Dimensional objects how to interact in the digital world, affording an 
increasingly sophisticated “real-life-like” physics that can have GEL (e.g., where objects 
have mass and respond to gravity, with drag and angular drag, and can have velocity and 
respond appropriately when given levels of force and torque are applied, given drag).  We 
can record how objects (and agents, including one’s self character) are moving, and 
responding in the world, and relating to other objects and others (e.g., intelligent agents) 
over time.  Advances in voice recognition and sophisticated game physics, like real-world 
physics, enables the design of virtual environments that are more representative of 
31 Unity games can be built once and then used across over 20 different platforms including on 
smartphones, iPads/tablets, computers of every sort; it is used in about half of all games developed since 
2005, and is relatively easy to learn and use, and has a real-time game engine -- software development 
environment (https://unity3d.com/unity/features/multiplatform).  
 
 
real-life SOI and BOI for our POI, facilitating embodied simulations and a sense of social 
and physical presence.  
Neuroscience Measurement in SRD Using Virtual Environments 
A wide range of biobehavioral indicators (e.g., eye tracking software; 
physiological measurements, such as skin conductance, heart rate, blood pressure) could 
be used with SRD while individuals are playing a game, whether using VR or not (Miller, 
Jeong, & Christensen, 2019; Miller et al., 2019; Weibel, Grubel, Zhao, & Schinazi, 
2018).  A large exception involves the use of fMRI with VR, where VR involves the 
user’s own actual bodily movement: This is because one must remain relatively still in a 
scanner.  To try to provide something akin to a VR experience using fMRI ,  researchers 32
have modified the VR headset so that it can be used in a scanner, but it doesn’t afford the 
same sense of bodily presence that bodily movement affords (for a review see 
Wiederhold & Weiderhold, 2008). Nevertheless, the use of this modified headset using 
fMRI appears promising for a range of applications: For example, researchers have 
examined the effects of alcohol intoxication on virtual driving, both behaviorally and 
neurally (Calhoun et al., 2005), and the use of the modified headset to study its capacity 
to reduce pain, both in terms of self-report and also neural patterns (Hoffman, Richards, 
Coda, Richards, & Sharar, 2003; Hoffman et al., 2004; ​Parsons, Gaggioli, & Riva, 2017 
see also, ​Bohil, Alicea, & Biocca, 2011 who used EEG in conjunction with fMRI ).  
These effects may be extended into social interactions: Schilbach et al. (2006) found 
neural evidence that human observers can be socially entrained by virtual characters to 




whom they attribute communicative intention. The user experience with modified 
headsets in a scanner (where the user does not actually bodily move as with regular VR) 
can involve the sense of moving in a virtual space (Wiederhold & Weiderhold, 2008): 
This is similar to what a user can experience within a non-VR interactive narrative (IN) 
game (Christensen et al., 2013).  
Using representative virtual IN games in fMRI scanners, one can examine how 
individuals differ in their ​neural circuit​ responses, for example, to sexually risky decision 
points versus conversational decision points (Smith et al., 2018).  Neurofeedback fMRI 
studies today strive to diagnose, train (i.e., enhance self-regulation) , and monitor neural 33
responses in contexts where atypical neural connectivity may adversely impact behavior 
(Robineau et al., 2017).  SRD could optimize the potential GEL and causal-inferences 
possible in such work.  Furthermore, because each level of the game could represent, for 
example, a month (yet be played in minutes), SRD IN games offer a “crunched time” 
capacity potentially  useful in capturing hard to observe patterns of virtual behavior over 
time (e.g., oscillating dynamic patterns) while also collecting neural patterning data.  
Dynamics that Might Otherwise be Hidden 
 ​One example of dynamics that might be more readily “observable” in a 
multilevel game is narcissism, a perplexing personality pattern.  Within a person, 
narcissism seems to include both periods of expressed grandiosity and vulnerability 
(Pinus, Cain, & Wright, 2014; Coleman, Pincus, & Smyth, 2019). Narcissistic individuals 
have an inflated sense of self-worth, prioritize their own needs and goals over those of 
33 See Emmert et al. (2016) for a meta-analysis of fMRI self-regulation neurofeedback. 
 
 
others, and believe that they are entitled to better treatment than that afforded others, and 
constantly seek admiration and recognition (Krizan & Herlache, 2018).  The vulnerability 
pattern likely emerges when the supports for this inflated self-worth are threatened.  In 
that context, narcissistic individuals’ self-regulatory capabilities are readily challenged 
and impaired (J. D. Miller, Lynam, Hyatt, & Campbell, 2017; Pincus, Roche, & Good, 
2015). ​ ​A variety of theoretical perspectives (Morf, 2006; Krizan & Herlace, 2018; 
Pincus et al., 2015) argue that grandiosity and vulnerability patterns dynamically feed 
into and reinforce one another over time (e.g., Giacomin & Jordan, 2014, 2016; Gore & 
Widiger, 2016; Hyatt et al., 2018; for a review see Coleman et al., 2019).  However, it is 
hard to “observe” this potential oscillation pattern behaviorally and even harder to 
determine the control parameters (environmental; within-person) that underlie it.  As 
Coleman et al. (2019) note, the specific situational stressors that threaten narcissistic 
individuals have been hard to discern; the same dynamic (e.g., grandiose behavior and 
non-responsive or dismissive claims or overwhelming rejection/humiliation producing 
self-regulatory breakdowns) may operate in an interpersonal conversation over a few 
minutes or over months or years. Measuring these in-the-moment trigger-response 
interpersonal dynamics under controlled conditions is quite difficult: SRD in a virtual 
environment -- in conjunction with computational modeling to anticipate critical control 
parameters for within-person oscillations for a given individual -- is needed.  
The Value of SRD for Psychological Science 
 
 
SRD requires a great deal of “upfront” work (also see Appendix), but we suggest 
that the potential payoff is worth it.  We argue that SRD will enable psychologists to 
better address criticisms and advance psychology as a science. 
Psychology: Science or Scientific-y? 
Is psychology a science or just scientific-y? Outside the field, skepticism over 
whether psychology is or is not a science is not uncommon (Lilienfeld, 2012: 2017): It is 
also reflected in the occasional senate bill or congressional vote to strip ​National Science 
Foundation ​funding or occasional claims that surface in the public (e.g, newspapers, 
blogs).  Berezow, a microbiologist, for example, argued that psychology was not a 
science because “psychology often does not meet the five basic requirements for a field 
to be considered scientifically rigorous: clearly defined terminology, quantifiability, 
highly controlled experimental conditions, reproducibility and, finally, predictability and 
testability” (Berezow, July 13, 2012). Not surprisingly, psychologists argue they meet 
these tests (e.g., Wilson, 2012): We share the frustration. But, it is worth noting that well 
into the 1900’s, prominent physicists viewed only physics as a science  (Bernal, 1939).  34 35
So what changed for biology and chemistry?  And is there a lesson for psychology?  
What Makes Nobel-Worthy Science?   
34 Rutherford, who won a Nobel Prise Prize in Chemistry was overheard noting that science is either 
physics or stamp collecting.  
35 The physicist Hoffman more recently noted, “When I was in high school, I loved science and 
mathematics, but I could never get too excited about biology. It seemed like a lot of tedious memorization 
and ad hoc theories and appeared to lack the coherence, clarity, and universality of physics. This remained 
my opinion for many years” (Hoffman, 2012, p. 2).  
 
 
To answer this question, we looked at what makes for unquestionably good 
“science”.  We did so by examining the past decade of Nobel Prize  winners in the 36
“hard” sciences, a noble aspiration.  
Criteria for Nobel science include innovative methods. ​ Many of the criteria 
for who/what wins a Nobel Prize in the hard sciences appear to involve innovative 
methods. These are described in more detail below.  
 ​Precisely measure the smallest critical unit.  ​The criterion involves affording 
observation of the smallest critical unit in dynamic interaction with other critical units, 
often, in real-time. The goal is not only greater precision but greater accuracy (National 
Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, 2019) in for example, measuring 
these key units in interaction with other key units/concepts, or in observing how they 
operate -- within cells -- at lower levels of scale).  In chemistry, for example, 
Nobel-worthy methods enable insight into intercellular communication via 
hormone-receiving receptors (Nobel Media AB, 2012) and the development of 
Super-resolved Fluorescence Microscopy (Nobel Media AB, 2014) to look inside living 
cells in operation and literally see how molecules interact at the nanoscale level.   37
Improve experimental capabilities. ​In Physics, Geim and Novoselov (Nobel 
Media AB, 2010) found innovative ways to create a 2-Dimensional material, graphene, in 
which a single layer (one sheet) of atoms were arranged in ​hexagon ​forms ​, ​opening up 
new possibilities for exquisitely controlled experiments of electron behavior. Haroche 
36 There is a Nobel prize in physics, chemistry, and medicine/physiology, but not biology per se. Nor is 
there a Nobel Prize (officially) in the social sciences.  
37 Note that the level of scale here for this precision and dynamic examination of molecules in their context 
is at the level of molecules and cells, not whole organisms.  
 
 
and Wineland (Nobel Media AB, 2012) created groundbreaking experimental methods to 
better measure and experimentally manipulate individual quantum systems. 
Use computational methods to illuminate the complex patterns of critical units. 
The focus is on understanding complex interactions across scale.  For example, the Nobel 
Prize in Chemistry (Nobel Media AB, 2013) was awarded “for the development of 
multiscale models for complex chemical systems”) .  Karplus, Levitt, and Warshel used 38
quantum and classical mechanics and computational tools to calculate complex chemical 
reactions when new molecules are formed, aiding prediction and hypothesis testing.  
Afford manipulation and change.​ ​For example, Arnold leveraged evolutionary 
theory for new methods for protein development -- directed evolution of enzymes -- to 
solve chemical problems (Nobel Media AB, 2018a).  In Physics (Nobel Media 2018b) 
Ashkin was awarded one for tools--optical tweezers-- that can use laser light to move 
small particles, and living bacteria, without harming them: He also subsequently used 
them to investigate “the machinery of life”.  
Additional criteria. ​  ​We identified two additional common criteria.  The second 
major Nobel criterion involves the relevance and potential that the innovation had for 
large social impact that accompanied paradigm shifts.  For example, Arnold’s work 
involving directed evolution of enzymes could be used to solve social problems (Nobel 
Media AB, 2018a). The third major Nobel criterion for discoveries in physics, chemistry, 
38 The 1998 Nobel Prize in Chemistry (Nobel Media AB, 1998) was won for computational tools: Pople for 
developing computational methods for quantum chemistry and Kohn’s involved a density functional 
approach. The 1999 Nobel Prize in Physics (Nobel Media AB, 1999) involving computational modeling 
was awarded to Veltman and Hooft in quantum field theory.  
 
 
and biology involved theory, usually this involved the testing of  or advancement of 39
cumulative “big” or “bigger theory.” Those “bigger theories” included, in physics, the 
Standard Model in particle physics (Mann, 2010) and Einstein’s Theory regarding 
gravitational waves (Steinicke, 2005); in chemistry, the Periodic Table (Scerri, 2007); in 
medicine/physiology, Evolutionary Theory (Darwin, 1859/2002)).  
A “hard science” Nobel for a Psychologist? ​Psychologists or those trained in 
psychology have been awarded a Nobel Prize in Medicine/Physiology, most recently in 
2014 for discovering the brain’s neural positioning system, O’Keefe (a psychologist/ 
neuroscientist) won his portion for the discovery of “place cells” (CA1 hippocampus area 
(see O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978)) and the Mosers, both neuroscientists, won theirs for 
discovering a correspondence between a ​hexagonal​ grid with evenly spaced (and same 
direction/size) electrode spike firing of nerve cells in the rat’s brain in the dorsocaudal 
medial entorhinal cortex (dMEC) during the rat’s movement/positioning in his 
environment that coordinated with the CA1 hippocampus area “place cells” (Moser, 
Kropff, & Moser, 2008).  Drawing from the nobel criteria above, this work identified 
smaller critical units ​(i.e., grid cells) that in interaction with one another and with other, 
place cells, provide insight into fundamental questions ​across scale ​about how brains 
have the capacity to navigate in our environment (e.g., representing position, direction, 
and velocity). Additional discoveries since this Nobel was awarded indicate that the 
uniform hexagon space grid “warps” in line with the reward learning histories for specific 
motivations/goals in a given context (Butler, Hardcastle, & Giocomo, 2019; see also 
39 Providing the basis for refuting “bigger theory” or strong systematic evidence that undermines major 
theoretical assumptions of established theory could also provide a basis for an award in science at this level.  
 
 
work by Boccara, Nardin, Stella, O’Neill, & Csicsvari, 2019).   The content of this work 40
and its innovative and ​paradigm changing methods ​ seem tantalizingly within our grasp as 
psychologists.   41
Aspirational Psychological Science: SRD’s Role 
 ​Using the roadmap provided by Nobel Prize awards as a guide, what is the 
science towards which psychologists should aspire? SRD could help move us towards an 
aspirational science, advancing each of the following:  
Shared definitions of units of interest.​ ​ For social and personality psychologists, 
key units include, for example, situations (or contexts), for which we do not have shared 
definitions. Default control groups (DCGs), provide an initial concrete implementation of 
a person-in-context model (e.g., like a model system in biology) of one or more situations 
involving ongoing social interactions, and physical affordances.  With feedback (via 
virtual validity checks) to assure GEL, DCG could provide cumulatively more precise 
and accurate shared definitions of contexts and person-in-context interactions over time.  42
40 Furthermore, additional researchers, building on this work, investigating the combination of multisensory 
self-motion and place/landmark information​ in virtual environments with mice​ developed a network model 
whose principles were further tested, moving scientists towards a theoretical framework for understanding 
how environment and self-cues produce the spatial representations guiding goal-directed behavior 
(Campbell, Ocko, Mallory, Low, Ganguili & Giocomo, 2018).  
41 Indeed, the hippocampus plays a significant role across rodents and humans ​in decision-making 
involving approach-avoidance conflict: it is key, however, to study these motives concurrently ​(​Bach, 
Guitart-Masip, Packard,  Miró, Falip, Fuentemilla, & Dolan, 2014); Ito & Lee, 2016; Oehrn, Baumann, 
Fell,  Lee, Kessler, Habel, ​Hanslmayr, ​& Axmacher, 2015; O'Neil, Newsome, Li, Thavabalasingam, Ito, & 
Lee (2015). ) reminding us of N. E. Miller’s (1944) classic approach-avoid conflict research (and the 
importance of measurements in the rat’s ​movement in space​ as it negotiated this conflict). This suggests the 
need to revisit this work on movement to assess this conflict (Boyd, Robinson, & Fetterman, 2011) using 
today’s technologies (e.g., Oculus Rift/VR; animated characters interacting with humans) similar to what 
has and is currently being done, involving fine-grained head movements in both approach and avoid 
motivations in conflict situations Jeong, Feng, Krämer, Miller, & Marsella (2017).  
42 In building initial DCG, for example, we are concurrently testing assumptions about key features in it 
(e.g., settings and their affordances; structures in it (e.g., scripts); beginning and ending points, etc.). These 
evidence-based assumptions, for example, can be challenged (e.g., with comparisons with alternative 
models; by experimentally eliminating/altering aspects of the model in experimental comparisons to judge 
 
 
Precision measurement of critical units in dynamic interaction over time. ​ ​It 
can do so with automatically recorded precise observations (e.g., virtual choices; the 
physics of movements, such as avoiding/approaching others/objects) of an individual’s 
agent behavior interacting within social interactions and contexts; sophisticated 
intelligent social agents with known representative underpinning parameters; and with the 
capacity of SRD in virtual environments to  “crunch time,” this could enable  precision 
examination of the complex triggers and oscillating behavior patterns that can emerge for 
individuals in interaction with others over long periods of time.  43
Concurrent measurement of underpinning brain patterning​.  Concurrent 
measurement of underlying mechanisms while engaged in representative everyday 
interactions during extended social interaction is possible today (e.g., with fMRI, for 
example, Smith et al., 2018).  
Experimental manipulation, causal inference, and change assessment. ​  It is 
possible with SRD to compare an experimental group to a control group that differs only 
in the independent variable of interest.  The control group itself has generalizability to 
everyday life (Miller et al., 2019). 
Use of computational models and modeling “experiments.” ​Computational 
models (Read et al., 2010; Read, Smith, et al., 2017; Read, Droutman, Smith, & Miller, 
2017) were used in addressing prior puzzles in personality and social psychology such 
their altered virtual validity) to enhance cumulative science precision, accuracy, and insight into when, 
why, and how they differ in terms of impact. 
43 Furthermore, virtual validity checks in real-time (e.g., using smartphone and sensor technologies, 
including ecological momentary assessments (Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008) afford continued 




as how there could be more within-person variability across situations than 
between-person variability and still have stable traits such as the “Big-5”.   Such 44
computational experiments can guide SRD  development (Miller, Jeong, & Christensen, 45
2019) because they suggest, for example, the need to measure certain affordances in 
situations in everyday life and insure that those are represented in virtual environments 
as in everyday life for our BOI in our SOI and for our POI.   Data afforded in SRD 46 47
designed with these computational models in mind can be used to further test these 
models computationally (i.e., do we get the same results from a computational modeling 
of the same features as we do in terms of participant behaviors in virtual environments 
with SRD). This process can generate new hypotheses for testing in SRD.  
Translation methods to optimize scalability  and broader societal impact. 48
SRD provides one possible solution to better methods and more rapid translation for 
44  In building their computational models, Read and his colleagues argued that humans have universal 
approach and avoid systems and nested in them, universal goals: But the relative levels of chronic goals 
differ between individuals. Situations have different goal affordances as well. As individuals move into 
different situations (e.g., a friend appears; an alarm goes off), the situational affordances change: These 
combine with chronic goal activations to affect current competing goal activations, with the most activated 
goal driving behavior. Computational models virtual personalities (VP) -- where VP chronic activations 
were systematically manipulated -- indicated that there was tremendous within-person variability in 
behavior across situations, but at the same time entering each VP’s data (as we would for real subjects), and 
performing factor analyses produced across persons, the “Big 5”.  
45 In a way a given SRD DCG could be our “best guess” instantiation of the probability distributions of 
cues and sequences that constitute a specific context and sequential options and consequences in the 
real-world.  As suggested earlier, this seems analogous to the “model system” concept so critical in modern 
biology.  
46 In addition, because computational models can be used across scale (e.g., the interpersonal level, the 
individual level, and the neural level) to address personality and social psychological dynamics in 
producing emergent behavior (e.g., Read, Brown, Wang, & Miller, 2018), they can also suggest (across 
scale, for example in fMRI studies) what to measure and afford in building SRD.  
47 In short, computational modeling, since it requires the math and precision to build, provides 
psychologists with new methods in our toolkit for illuminating hidden assumptions and theoretical gaps, 
while also affording ways to iteratively build and improve SRD as well as testable theories (Marsella & 
Gratch, 2016; Marsella, Gratch, & Petta, 2010; Vallacher, Read, & Nowak, 2017; Farrell & Lewandowsky, 
2018) 




broader impact.  That is, if found effective, some of that experimental work could afford 
interventions that could rapidly move from experimental lab efficiency to effectiveness 
trials with broad utilization on a national level with relatively low cost to the public on a 
per capita ​ basis (Christensen et al., 2013).  Some game platforms (e.g., Unity) such as the 
one we used for our SOLVE game (Christensen et al., 2013), are highly cross-platform 
capable -- for example, game interventions developed for computers, can be easily 
implemented on other platforms (e.g., smartphones). These games could be extended as 
smartphone interventions or with other smartphone interventions, such as just-in-time 
adaptive interventions (JITAI), into individuals’ everyday life  (Nahum-Shani, Hekler, & 49
Spruijt-Metz, 2015; Nahum-Shani et al., 2018; Spruijt-Metz et al., 2015) .  Indeed, a 50
recent meta-analysis suggests that JITAI can be quite effective (Wang & Miller, in press).  
Reach towards “bigger theory”. ​  So many of our theories in social and 
personality psychology -- from the perspective of hard scientists -- would probably be 
viewed as “mini theories” where it’s hard to see how it all “adds up”.  Work in these, and 
most areas of psychology, is generally not tethered to and integrated into a “bigger 
theory”.  We elaborate on the “bigger theory” issue in its own section below and how 
49 Technological advances here are rapid, including in exquisite capabilities for voice recognition and 
emotion differentiation (see for example, Huang & Narayanan, 2017; Somandepalli et al., 2016) and the 
capacity to “pick up” complex contextual cue reactivity in craving (Traylor, Parrish, Copp, & Bordnick, 
2011).  
50 In this era of “big data” (Cai & Zhu, 2015; Kitchin, 2014; Provost & Fawcett, 2013), one question is what 
will we do with so much rich and complex data? Machine learning may provide one set of answers, but the 
cues, and the relationships among them that go into these algorithms can often be a “black box.” 
Furthermore, these cues may or may not be the cues that humans use in the same way (Cai &Zhu, 2015). 
SRD is a methodology through which big data can be leveraged to better create systematic control and 
experimental groups and to more systematically test how to “structure” data contextually to build better 
predictive models of human smart-phone and sensor data patterns over time.  
 
 
SRD could also assist there.  In all of these ways, we argue, that SRD would concurrently 
advance psychology as a science, and therefore, our place within the “hard” sciences.  
“Bigger Theory”and SRD 
Given emerging findings in cognitive science and neuroscience, we believe that 
psychology, broadly, may be “on the cusp” of an exciting paradigm shift if we can 
examine and manipulate ​features in context ​ that are important and representative of those 
that humans encounter (and are differentially motivated by) in their real-world ecologies. 
Since many of the authors are personality-social psychologists or from related social 
sciences, we use examples of social concepts to suggest how we could do this.  
 ​Bigger Theory Candidate: Predictive Coding 
Hierarchical prediction. ​Making sense of and acting in the world is what we do 
all the time, whether in virtual environments or in everyday life. It is nonetheless 
complex and not direct. Predictive coding is a major theory of how the brain is adapted to 
make probabilistic inferences (Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2011).  Predictive coding 51
affords a universal explanatory principle for the operation of the human brain and mind 
(Bar, 2011a; Friston & Kiebel, 2011).  As such, it’s a promising candidate for “bigger 
theory” in psychology -- as biologists, chemists, and physicists might think of it -- that 
also could guide us in developing systematic representative environments to better 
understand individuals in their interaction with one another in context.  Such SRD 
designed virtual environments could also guide our thinking about predictive coding in 
51 Although Clark (2013) mostly presents one predictive coding algorithm, different predictive coding 
models using alternative algorithms still vye for which better capture the data and which is the most 
neurobiologically plausible (Spratling, 2017).  
 
 
understanding social construction of causal meaning and social behavior in 
representative, dynamic, and contextualized person and situation interactions over time.  
 Clark (2013), reviewing work in cognitive science, computational modeling, and 
neuroscience, argues for predictive coding: That is, that the brain uses a hierarchical, 
multi-modal (e.g., Mesulam, 1998; Rauschecker & Tian, 2000; DeWitt & Rauschecker, 
2012) “bidirectional cascade of cortical processing,” generatively, to minimize prediction 
error between “top-down expectations or predictions” and “incoming sensory inputs” (p. 
181).   In the domain of perception -- and also in the domain of action -- humans in 52
trying to track a visually presented scene use prior knowledge, and “top-down” 
knowledge, to generate “a kind of ‘virtual version’ of the sensory data” (Clark, 2013, p. 
182).   For example, imagine a social outcome or consequence: For example, Mary was 
just injured. We might ask, “What or Who caused this?” “Why?” 
As Friston notes, starting with the consequence or effect, the brain essentially 
works backwards to identify the cause.  In doing so, we use causal structures (presumably 
evolved) in the brain “that distil the causal regularities in the sensorium and embody them 
in models of their world” that we can use to predict consequences (Friston, 2013, p. 
212-213).  The task is complex because there are many potential causes (e.g., of Mary’s 
injured state). What might be those structures (each represented here with an arbitrary 
letter) that our brains use to make causal inference about what happened here.  
[ ​A D G I X T P N ​] → With what consequence/effect 




Read and Miller (1998) argued that each of these “structures” or “slots” are likely to 
reflect “universal” linguistic concepts  across cultures (Wiezbicka, 1992) that include 53
“want”,  “as well as all of the words in the following ‘story’: I want this, you do this, this 
happened, this person did something bad, and something bad happened because of this.” 
(Read & Miller, 1998, p. 49).  And, as Friston (2013) notes, the neuroscience literature 
supports at least two likely candidates, those associated with “ ​separable attributes of 
‘what’ and ‘where’ [translating] into separate neuronal representations in segregated 
visual pathways” ​(Friston, 2013, p. 212-213, brackets added).   Furthermore, different 54
orderings of the same behaviors produce remarkably different social causal inferences 
(Read, Druian, & Miller, 1989): That suggests, “when” behavior relative to other 
behavior occurs, matters . Thus, candidates for the causal “slots” for making causal 55
inferences about the consequences/effects (e.g., Mary’s injury) that occur in social 
interactions may include the following candidates in brackets:  
 [Who /what] [Did/Said this] [to Whom/What] [How][Where][When]→ effect ,  [Why] 56 57 58
53 Read and Miller (1998) also closely examined the developmental literature (Read & Miller, 1995). For 
example, young children have a readiness to communicate wants (Gelman, 1990).  
54 The frontal cortex plays a domain general cognitive control function, selecting among competing 
representations and shifting and weighting algorithms between dorsal and ventral multimodal streams and 
numerous points of integration across ventral and dorsal streams (Bornkessel-Schlesewky et al., 2015a, 
2015b.) 
55 A critical feature in experiments is timing, the independent variable for example must precede the 
dependent variable as one important criterion for causal inference.  Of course, in everyday life, individuals 
use many of the criteria we use in experiments to make their own everyday causal inferences about the 
meaning of sequences of behavior.  
56 Face processing (and the anticipation of face processing) is especially associated with the fusiform face 
area (FFA) of the brain (Furl, Garrido, Dolan, Driver, & Duchaine, 2011). That is, specific “who” or 
“whom” assessments in understanding sequences of actions may be based on connections in one’s 
representation there. 
57 Roseman (2011) provides a hierarchical motive-based model pertaining to emotional “effects” that may 
serve to also motivate (e-motion) action. Might this theoretical model suggest possible neural (perhaps 
narratively based) slot unit linked underpinnings? 
58 Exciting work (i.e., Chang, Gianaros, Manuck, Krishnan & Wagner, 2015) in multivoxel pattern analysis 
(MVPA) that appears to afford sensitive and specific neural signatures for affect induced stimuli (e.g., 
 
 
And, the concrete narrative that might be generated in a situation as we tried to 
understand why Mary was injured, using these slots, might be the following:  
John shoved Mary hard at the luggage carousel just now causing her injury: 
He was in a hurry and didn’t care if he hurt her in the process. 
Just as only a few letters (26 in English) afford thousands of words, these “causal slots” 
of a scenario (we call a “plot unit”)  can afford an almost infinite number of concrete 
scenario descriptions, some so recurrent that in a given culture we may give them an 
economical conceptual name, such as here describing John’s behavior as aggressive or 
using trait terms if John has done things like this repeatedly (e.g., aggressive): Indeed, 
consistent with Read and Miller (1998), underlying many social concepts may be 
neurally linked “slots” in one or more of these “plot units” (see Figure 3).  Because there 
are so many ways that each of these categories of slots can be filled, there are many 
alternative causal inferences that could be activated across persons in understanding the 
meaning of a given sequence of behavior (although this set of alternatives is not 
unlimited).  As humans move from scene to scene, top-down inferences about a former 
scene can guide the meaning of a new or upcoming scene, dynamically enabling the 
construction of the interpretation that best “explains” what is happening, and reduces 
errors of prediction (due to surprise, Friston, 2013).  If these are important slots in 
making causal inferences, what’s the hierarchical nature of this process?  
aversive images) could benefit from fMRI recording during participant SRD representative scenarios 
engagement. It is an intriguing possibility that we could examine if such stable neural specific signature 
activations and their links recapitulate nongoing narratives (and conceptual plot units) in social interaction.  
 
 
Concretizing hierarchical prediction in social interaction. ​ ​Read and Miller 
(1998) used a recurrent neural network interactive activation and competition (IAC) 
modeling approach (McClelland & Elman, 1986; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; 
Rumelhart & McClelland, 1982): IAC is one approach, to help concretize the prediction 
processes humans may use to infer causal meaning in social interaction. Like the brain 
itself, an IAC approach assumes hierarchical structures and a parallel constraint 
satisfaction process in making causal inferences regarding the meaning of actions. As 
illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 (see Read & Miller for further detail), major social concepts 
(e.g.,  traits, states, relationships, roles, beliefs/attitudes, and so forth)  may “top down” 59
guide our causal interpretation of the ongoing social interaction at the event and sequence 
levels. Bottom up processes (e.g., from the feature analysis  and identification levels) 60
might send “error signals” up, producing surprise (e.g., Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 
2011) and the need for adjustments in predictive coding (Friston, 2013).  Figure 4 helps 
illustrate some of the links, and spreading activation involved in settling on a competing 
interpretation of an ongoing social interaction and how it changes with new input.  
Event models are predictive models of the near future that provide a “top-down” 
frame or bias that allows the person perceiver to fill in and disambiguate ambiguous 
information. Consistent with the idea of events as predictive models, an event typically 
59 These social concepts themselves are apt to be based on underlying learning histories with respect to 
various combinations of plot units.  
60 There are extensive literatures focused on “person”/“object” perception as well as action perception-- and 
the links among these to social judgments.  For example, there is considerable work on features 
underpinning face perception and the relationship of these features to social judgements such as dominance 
and competence (e.g., Todorov, Dotsch, Porter, Oosterhof, Falvello, 2013) or attractiveness (e.g., 




ends when there is high prediction error; at this point the perceiver starts to build a new 
event model, and when possible, integrate it with the prior event (Radvansky & Zacks, 
2014). As perceivers may create hierarchies of event models at different “grain” sizes, 
prediction error and likelihood of updating a model may differ at different “grain” sizes.  
Predictive Coding in Building Virtual Environments for SRD. ​ ​ The literature on 
predictive coding makes it clear that ​context matters tremendously ​. For the brain, prior 
knowledge, including what just happened and what we believe the perceiver/doer is 
anticipating/expecting matters (e.g., Clark, 2013).   ​It matters in experiments. ​ ​As Clark 61
(2013) notes, this “means that we need to be very careful when generalizing from 
ecologically strange laboratory conditions [e.g., faces without bodies] that effectively 
deprive us of such ongoing context.” (p. 203, material in brackets added).   This is a 62
major reason why our laboratory contexts need to be representative of everyday life: If 
not, it’s neither clear what our findings really mean nor whether our findings are likely to 
have GEL.  And ​that, ​ ​we would argue, is critical for our status as a science.  
How does predictive coding help guide SRD development? ​ In building a virtual 
environment for SRD based on predictive coding, how do we start?  Predictive coding 
suggests that in developing DCG that are representative for our purposes, we should 
insure in our virtual environment that game players can use the same process (and can 
61 As Clark notes, Helmholtz (1860) had “the key idea that sensory systems are in the tricky business of 
inferring sensory causes from their bodily effects. This in turn involves computing multiple probability 
distributions, since a single such effect will be consistent with many different sets of causes distinguished 
only by their relative (and ​context dependent​) probability of occurrence” (Clark, 2013, p. 182, italics 
added).  
62 For other discussions pertaining to contextualization and its importance, see Kveraga et al., (2007), Bar 




access the same representative features) for meaning construction during an unfolding 
social interaction scenario in a virtual IN game as that same POI in the SOI for the BOI 
would need in everyday life. 
We know a great deal about the features underpinning scenario construction, and 
in expanding on that and leveraging it in creating SRD, we can systematically (and with 
recurrent feedback from participants in developing our SRD to achieve this) reproduce 
in our virtual worlds what humans need (e.g., in the way of cues) to make inferences 
they are likely to make in these same everyday contexts. We can test hypotheses and 
build theories about probability distributions in these representative social virtual worlds 
that are more consistent with those in the real-world while insuring our science fits with 
work emerging across psychology (e.g., cognition, decision-making, language, memory, 
perception, social interaction, speech) as well as in the biological and neuroscience 
literatures.   63
Advancing Psychological Science 
SRD as a Tool for “Crisis Management” 
As the above discussion suggests there are a number of benefits to SRD, including 
its potential to grapple with current and recurring crises in the field and to leverage 
criticisms to develop new methods to address those criticisms and advance our science. 
This includes the relevance crisis (Pettigrew, 2018), and building capacity to leverage 
theory and research for effective, impactful interventions. It also includes the related 
63 Computational models that take priors (prior constructions; top down concepts) into account in guiding 
subsequent causal inferences in ongoing social interactions. This could help model and predict users’ causal 
meaning inferences in interacting in virtual (and to the extent possible real-life corresponding) situations. 
Those computational models could also generate testable hypotheses for participants causal inferences 
within and about both virtual and real-life ongoing situations over time.  
 
 
generalizability of our work to everyday life (GEL), the crisis in homogenous samples of 
POI (Henrich et al., 2010), and the replication crisis (National Academies of Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine, 2019). Other emerging crises are the need for paradigms that 
better bridge levels of scale (Cacioppo et al, 2000), for example, between behavior in 
extended social interaction and neural circuit patterning, and finally, the capacity to build 
a cumulative science, involving increasingly more precise methods/measures and an 
understanding of how these experiments fit in the fabric of a “bigger theory,” affording 
prediction and testability (see above).  
Integration of Approaches is Essential 
Cronbach’s (1957) APA presidential address, published in the ​American 
Psychologist, ​noted that there were historically two streams of research differing in 
method and approach: experimental and correlational. He argued that integrating these 
approaches was critical: Otherwise, he said,  
they can give only wrong answers or no answers at all regarding certain important 
problems…A united discipline will ... be concerned with the otherwise neglected 
interactions between organismic and treatment variables.  Our job is to invent 
constructs and to form a network of laws which permits prediction.  From 
observations we must infer a psychological description of the situation and the 
present state of the organism.  Our laws should permit us to predict from this 
description, the behavior of organism-in-situation (pp. 681-682). 
The current approach we have proposed suggests ways to move further towards 
this goal.  We argue that we may be at the “tipping point” for a paradigm shift in 
 
 
experimental design.  Systematic Representative Design, as envisioned here, combines 
correlational and experimental approaches, and affords generalizability to everyday life 
as well as the capacity for experimental causal inference.   A technology-enabled SRD 64
could enhance our science in myriad ways (e.g., precision, robustness and reliability, 
generalizability to everyday life, cumulative potential for bigger theory, usefulness) and 
fill the context gap.  Systematic Representative Design could also help bridge historical 
divides, provide tools across scale, support new persons-in-situation methods, better 
interface with cognitive science, neuroscience, computational science, and artificial 
intelligence, and help better claim psychology’s place in the “hard” sciences.     
64 Given a predictive coding approach to developing SRD, there is also the possibility of building in 
representative environments that afford opportunities for examining variability in how individuals make 
causal inferences within, for example, a given DCG and in assessing what can alter those patterns (e.g., 
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Comparing Three Designs on Inference Goals and Strategies to Achieve Them 








Cause-Effect       
Study Phase  Design Causal Analysis Design + Analysis 
Timing IV -> DV Sometimes IV -> DV 




Random Assignment Analysis Random Assignment 
Control (CG) and 
Experimental (EG) Analysis 
Default Control (DCG) 
+ EG on DCG 




EV, but Even If EV, 
GEL Unknown 
GEL; If GEL, 
Then EV Likely 
GEL; If GEL, Then EV 
Likely 
Representative? Atypical Task Analysis Task Analysis 






Occurring Naturally Occurring 







Representatively Designing a Default Control Group: Social 
Scientist Steps for Intelligent Agent/Game Designer Collaborator 
in Building Default Control Group 
Step Concept Example 
1 
  
Identify Behavior(s) of 
Interest (BOI) 
Condomless Anal Sex 
(CAS) 
2 
Identify Samples of 
Population of Interest 
(POI) 
Young Men who have 
Sex with Men (YMSM) 
3 
Identify Most Frequent 
Settings (MFS) 




House Party; Bar/Club; 
Internet (First Contact) 
4 Extract Details,  Relevant Cues 
Cues for POI in MFS; 
Partner Selection 
Attributes  
5 Identify Scripts in MFS “Pick Up”; “Sexual Script” 
6 Identify Components of Scripts (SC) 
Bar Pick-Up Steps: 
Enter/Check Scene; 
Zero in on Prospective 
Target; Create Reason 
to Meet; Get to Know; 
Test waters; Escalate 
Intimacy; Seal the deal 
7 
“Entry” and “Exit” 
Conditions for Each SC 
and Specified (Extract 





Sequences can go 
Differently 
Bar Pick-Up from “Test 
Waters” to “Escalate 
Intimacy” Example: (1) 
Pretext to Touch (e.g., 
Love the Feel of your 
Shirt, is it Silk?); If go, 
(2) Reduce Distance 
(e.g., Dance) (3) Brush 
up “Accidently” 
(Deniability) Until 
more Intimate (e.g., 
Touch Leg); If Go, Exit 
(4) Enter Escalate 
Intimacy (more Direct, 
 
 
Foreplay), Desire for 
Sex Mutual, if 
Threshold Exit; (5) 
Enter “Seal the Deal”). 
8 
Identify Challenges 
(e.g., to Safer Sex) 
Embedded in Sequence 
up to BOI for POI; 
When/How they Occur 
Frequent Obstacles 
(e.g., Alcohol) Given 
BOI and POI. In 
“Getting to Know” 










In “Getting to Know,” 
Compliments Afford 
Positivity Threshold. 
Specify for POI, 
Positively Rated 
Compliments in Bar 
Scenario. Specify 
Behavior Options; 
Choice Basis (e.g., in 
Attachment Styles)  




















Figure 3.  
The bi-directional information flow between the levels of the Constraint Satisfaction 








Figure 4. Constraint Satisfaction Model of Social Perception, Specific Example  
 
 
 
 
